Experience rating is largely absent from medical malpractice insurance contracts. This article presents evidence that physician risk differences persist, and it develops an empirical model for experience rating with a semi-parametric estimator. Estimating the model using claims history data from Florida, the authors obtain improved prediction of individual claims over several years and provide a detailed picture of the incidence of surcharges under experience rating. This evidence suggests that an experience rating system would be feasible and would greatly reduce the subsidization across physician risk types that exists under most current medical malpractice insurance contracts.
INTRODUCTION
Experience rating, i.e., adjusting premiums based on claims history, is the norm in many insurance settings such as workers compensation, and automotive and health insurance. In workers compensation, for example, the amount firms must contribute depends on the rate at which their employees have made claims in the past. In medical malpractice insurance, however, it is rarely found (Weiler et al., 1993) . Adjusting insurance premiums through experience rating has two benefits: (1) cross-subsidization of high-risk subscribers by those subscribers of low risk is reduced and (2) highrisk subscribers are given incentives to find cost-effective ways to reduce risk. For these reasons, economists have advocated the adoption of experience rating in medical malpractice insurance, and two states have made a limited form of experience rating mandatory (Weiler et al., 1993) .
Earlier experiments with experience rating in malpractice insurance, whether initiated by private insurance carriers or mandated by states, were abandoned in the face of strong physician opposition (Sloan, Bovbjerg, and Githens, 1991) . Such strong resistance to experience rating is surprising given the expected gains to most physicians. Sloan (1990) observes that opposition by physicians may derive from uncertainty about the extent of the cross-subsidization in the current system or from beliefs that apparent differences among physicians are because of chance or misinformation. In addition, the feasibility of estimating risk components for individual physicians has been questioned because malpractice claims arise with relatively low frequency. Also, the variation in the aggregate level of these claims over time renders implementation more difficult.
1 This study considers the feasibility of experience rating using data on malpractice claims from 1985 through 1992 for a panel of Florida physicians. This allows the authors to assess how experience rating would affect the cost structure of insurance for physicians.
Existing studies have not adequately addressed the desirability of experience rating from the viewpoint of the affected parties. In particular, the consequences of using fitted parameters from an econometric model to design contracts that incorporate individual heterogeneity have not been shown. This study addresses a number of related questions. First, the authors present empirical models with and without experience rating to determine the extent of cross-subsidization in the current, nonexperiencerated insurance contracts. The estimates reveal remarkable detail about the distribution of benefits and costs that would accompany adoption of experience rating.
Second, this article presents a new measure for the individual-specific determinant of claims history that can be used in rating. The authors examine the correlation between heterogeneity and the observable characteristics of the physicians, such as the number of patient visits or geographic region. If observable characteristics could be incorporated into a priori (non-experience based) risk classification ratings, there would be no case for experience rating. Indeed, others have reported that some such a priori rating is the norm (Blair and Makar, 1988) . Experience rating, however, involves further a posteriori imputation of individual risk heterogeneity as a component distinct from those effects associated with observable characteristics. 2 The present semi-parametric model has a natural economic interpretation, allowing the assignment to each individual of a risk type as a posterior update from a discrete set of underlying risk types in the data. 1 The absence of experience rating in malpractice insurance would be expected if all physicians in a premium class have the same expected number of accidents. Many empirical studies, however, find the opposite. Analyses of data on the frequency of claims in Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Florida find heterogeneity of risk within a given physician specialty (Rolph, 1981 (Rolph, , 1991 Nye and Hofflander, 1988; Venezian, Nye, and Hofflander, 1989; Ellis, Gallup, and McGuire; 1990) . 2 Sloan and Hassan (1990) show that residual heterogeneity within risk classification groups is reduced but not eliminated when the a priori risk groups are based on more information than just physician specialty. Their study provides the best support to date for the presence of residual heterogeneity in claims. Their results, however, cannot rule out the alternative hypothesis that heterogeneity is due to covariate effects because they rely on a probit to model claims occurrence. The probit specification does not differentiate between physicians with one claim and those with ten. From the perspective of experience rating, however, these repeat offenders may pose the greatest concern. Furthermore, Sloan and Hassan (1990) do not assess the performance of their model in out-of-sample prediction, which is crucial to the question of whether measured risk differences are persistent.
Additionally, by estimating individual risk jointly with the a priori risk classification scheme, the model improves on the forecasting of future claims in comparison with existing models in the literature that use a priori or a posteriori ratings alone.
Third, this study examines the accuracy of forecasts from the experience rating model using eight years of data on malpractice insurance claims. Unlike previous studies, this study takes the crucial step of cross-validation, i.e., fitting the model, using it to forecast one year to three years ahead and then assessing the properties of the forecast. Physicians may oppose the experience rating methodology on fairness grounds if the model incorrectly places them in a high-risk/high-premium category, and especially if such misclassification fails to be corrected over time (Palfrey and Spatt, 1985) . Results of the current study, however, show that large forecast errors on a physician's expected number of claims are rare, and when they occur, they are reduced greatly in subsequent years.
In the next section, a Poisson model of claims is developed for jointly estimating the covariate effects and a nonparametric heterogeneity distribution. The sample of Florida physicians used in the empirical analysis is described in the third section. The model includes covariates that insurers do use or could use in designing a priori rating schedules to determine whether the residual heterogeneity is sufficient to warrant experience rating. The fourth section presents the results and an evaluation of in-sample prediction, as well as out-of-sample forecasting, to gauge the persistence of individual heterogeneity over time. The implications of the results for the distribution of surcharges and discounts under experience rating are presented and discussed in the final two sections.
POISSON MODELS OF MALPRACTICE CLAIMS

Specification
Malpractice claims against an individual physician are random, repeatable events that can be approximated as a Poisson process. Suppose one can observe characteristics of a physician's practice that are relevant to the claims experience i x . For example, some specialties such as surgery or internal medicine may naturally give rise to greater incidence of malpractice claims. Likewise, the age and experience of the physician may affect the frequency of judgment errors that give rise to compensable injuries. In a homogeneous Poisson model, the expected number of claims for the ith physician, M i , would be given by
, where C is the vector of parameters to be empirically estimated. In addition, as the aggregate volume of claims is affected by changes in tort law and litigation, medical malpractice claims tend to exhibit temporal heterogeneity. To model across-the-board variations in intensity, the proportional intensity at time t is given by
, where M( ) t is constant across individuals. The cumulative intensity for each individual is then obtained by integrating over the time that has elapsed. In this case, claims will be Poisson distributed with mean and variance
, where
In this model, variations in the intensity of litigation will affect only the interpretation of the intercept term.
The authors observed physician practice, location characteristics, and the number of claims over a five-year period, \, , 1, . . .,
, for a sample of more than 9,000 physicians. The specification of covariates is normally incomplete in empirical applications, leaving individual-specific heterogeneity in the observed number of claims. Such unexplained heterogeneity would appear as overdispersion in the homogeneous Poisson model. While the heterogeneity distribution is often modeled with a gamma distribution, 3 mainly for its practical convenience, the present model employs a distribution-free estimator of the individual-specific random effect. The main drawback of the gamma distribution would seem to be the inadequate mass in the right tail, given that, in the data, a small number of the highest risk doctors account for a disproportionately large number of malpractice claims. The nonparametric approach allows the data to determine the shape of the heterogeneity distribution. In general, the data are sufficient to estimate a heterogeneity distribution nonparametrically (Heckman and Singer, 1984) . Specifying a fully parametric model can lead to overparameterization and biased estimates. 
As noted earlier, when malpractice claims follow a process in which the intensity varies over time but other coefficients do not, then the only parameter affected will be the intercept. 5 More generally, both the independent variables and the parameters of the underlying heterogeneity distribution may not be invariant with respect to time. Observations on time-varying covariates are not available for this study. 6 3 Cooil (1991) follows this approach. In the authors' preliminary empirical results, the differences between the negative binomial and the nonparametric models were surprisingly small. 4 In mixed Poisson models, one need only consider discrete mixing distributions with a finite set of support points for maximum likelihood, following Simar (1976) and Lindsay (1983) . 5 Temporal heterogeneity has a scale effect on the predicted number of claims. If the proportional intensity at time t is given ( )
, then the cumulative intensity for individual i could be obtained by integrating over the time elapsed. Let 
However, the intercept in the mixed Poisson model cannot be separately identified from the support points of the mixing distribution. 6 While physicians may be changing in observable and unobservable ways following the occurrence of malpractice claims, the incentives to do so are limited under the current nonexperience-rated insurance policies. The results reported later showing the accuracy of the forecast for one-year-ahead prediction for 1990 through 1992 may help to mitigate concerns about this problem. Simar (1976) and Lindsay (1981 Lindsay ( , 1983 discuss maximum likelihood estimation of the mixed Poisson model. The method adopted for this study uses the algorithm suggested by Heckman and Singer (1984) to estimate parameters, while incorporating a more efficient method to obtain estimates of the mixing distribution (Lesperance and Kalbfleisch, 1992) .
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For the nonparametric model, the sampling distribution of the estimators has not been derived, although it is required for inference testing and for calculating unconditional estimates of claims frequency. Estimates of the sampling distribution were obtained from a modified jackknife estimator. First, 500 random subsamples were generated by randomly deleting one-fourth of the observations in the full sample. Next, the model was estimated over each sample, and the sampling distribution of the estimators was derived from the resulting empirical distribution. Finally, the method of cross-validation, i.e., splitting the sample into two contiguous periods and using predictions based on the earlier period to forecast the latter, was used to check for prediction error (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) . The closed claims for each physician are recorded during an observation period, and the models above are fitted to the data. A forecast of the expected number of claims is made for the following one-year contract period, given the physician's claims history.
Assigning Risk Parameters to Individual Physicians
A natural economic interpretation of the support points of the mixing distribution is that they represent the underlying risk types in the population. Let k t indicate the kth risk type, corresponding to the kth support point of the mixing distribution, and let Q k indicate the estimated (prior) probability of type k. Following Bayes' Rule, the posterior probability that individual i is type k, given the number of reported claims, i y , is . Likewise, the forecast probability of a given number of claims, i n , can be written in terms of posterior probabilities:
Furthermore, one can think of the experience rating process as assigning each doctor a risk type. It is straightforward to combine the probability estimates and support points to construct a posterior estimate of the risk type for each physician:
This provides a continuous scalar measure that is used below to rank physicians from the lowest risk to successively higher risk types.
Experience rating is based on the posterior estimates of risk. The expected number of claims conditional on the physician's characteristics and claims history is a weighted product of Equation (3):
In the absence of experience rating, the insurer recognizes covariates when forecasting claims and setting rates, but it does not try to infer the individual's heterogeneity component. The expected claims for physician i are calculated using the prior rather than the posterior heterogeneity distribution:
The latter is obviously a stylized account of the actuarial calculations that insurance companies construct, but it incorporates all available information, short of assigning individual random effects. Given the apparent simplicity of prevailing practices in the pricing of malpractice insurance (Sloan and Hassan, 1990) , this assumption gives a conservative benchmark to compare with experience rating.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FLORIDA CLAIMS
Sampling Considerations
Data for this study contain details on malpractice suits that have been closed for a sample of Florida physicians. 9 Closed claims that were first reported to the insurer in the years 1985 through 1989 provide an initial five-year observation period followed by the one-year contract (forecast) periods repeated with updates through 1992. The claims are organized by the date the claim was reported to the insurer because this is the way malpractice insurance is written. In choosing the sample, claims ending with no payment were excluded, as were claims for newly licensed physicians. The authors discuss each of these considerations below.
The current study assumes a simplified setting in which an observation period of five years is followed by an insurance contract period of a single year, but timing issues are more complex in reality. The majority of insurance policies are claims-made policies-policies that cover all claims filed during the policy year. Hence, the insurer will need to have a model that predicts the number of claims filed during the contract year. The present approach mirrors this structure by counting claims during the year in which they are filed with the insurer. A potential problem with this approach is that one can only observe a claim in the data after it has actually closed. Medical malpractice insurance is known for its long claims tail: in Florida, 2 percent of claims that are filed are not settled over five years after the occurrence of the malpractice event (Cooil, 1991) . Because the present data on closed claims are comprehensive through the first half of 1999, the authors are using a relatively early sample period 10 The physician data were supplied by Barry Mittan from his Florida Practitioner Database and are drawn from public and proprietary sources, including the Florida Department of Professional Regulation and the Florida Medical Association. 11 Physicians may not have practiced in every year since obtaining a license. If a temporary suspension of practice is correlated with adverse experience (because of a suspended license, for example), then the data will tend to understate the correlation of claims incidence. However, this sample excludes physicians who have discontinued practice before 1992, so any physicians who lost their licenses or chose to leave as a result of adverse claims experience would not be observed.
from 1985 through 1992 for reported claims to minimize this problem. It must be acknowledged, however, that a few claims that were filed between 1985 and 1992 may still be open and, thus, unobserved in the data.
The claims-made feature of malpractice insurance will, in a few cases, lead to ambiguities in forecasting future claims because some claims will have been filed with the insurer for which losses are not yet determined. Although insurers will begin learning about the merits of a claim from the time it is filed, both fairness and simplicity argue for waiting for the resolution of a claim before imposing any surcharges. Sloan (1990) argues, however, that open claims may be more useful predictors of future claims than closed claims because they reflect the most recent quality or performance of the physician. To resolve the ambiguity about whether claims filed in a given year will eventually lead to payment, the authors will assume that the insurer is able to predict whether an open claim will lead to payment.
In constructing the sample with the benefit of hindsight, claims that eventually ended with payments of $100 or less were excluded. The authors define payments to include indemnity and loss adjustment expenses, such as attorneys' fees, as reported by the insurer. Either the physician or the physician's insurer made payments in just more than 85 percent of the claims resolved between 1985 and 1995. Explicit deductibles and copayments are rare in medical malpractice liability insurance (Danzon, 1991) , and the physicians made payments in only 1 percent of the claims with positive payments. Payments by excess insurers were also infrequent, occurring in only 2 percent of paid claims. The distribution of payments for paid claims is highly skewed, with a median payment of less than $15,000 and a mean of more than $80,000.
Finally, claims for newly licensed physicians were not included. The sample consists of all Florida physicians with four or more years of experience in 1985 who were still practicing in 1992. 10 In a study of suits resulting from emergency-room and birth-related injuries in Florida, Sloan et al. (1993) found that there were more than four years, on average, between the injury occurrence and the resolution of the suit. The present data on a broader set of injuries reveal an average claim duration that is slightly more than three years. These lags imply that physicians who have just entered practice would not be expected to have any claims close during the first few years of practice. To control for this lag in the arrival of closed claims, the sample of physicians was restricted to doctors who were licensed before 1981. Thus, the least experienced physicians in the sample will have no fewer than four years of practice that could produce a closed claim in 1985. After deleting physicians with incomplete records, there were 9,059 physicians who were licensed before 1981 and still practicing in 1992.
11 These physicians were matched by license number with the reported claims data.
Model Specification
The authors' model incorporates covariates that may be used in setting rates for malpractice insurance. Sloan, Bovbjerg, and Githens (1991) surveyed malpractice insurers and found that they all varied rates by specialty. In addition, many insurers varied rates on the basis of other characteristics. These characteristics include geographic region within state, hours worked, years of experience, years with insurer, number in insurance group, specific procedures (e.g., obstetrics), and attendance at loss control seminars. Variations in premiums charged by region and specialty can be large. In 1985, for example, physicians in Miami Dade and Broward Counties paid more than 1.5 times the average for the rest of the state, while physicians in some specialties paid more than five times the average rate for family practitioners (Blair and Makar, 1988 ).
An appendix with the variable descriptive statistics is available from the authors on request. Physician specialties were divided into ten broad groups, with one residual group ("Other Specialties") comprising several smaller specialties (including allergy/ immunology, dermatology, ophthalmology, pathology, preventive medicine, and psychiatry).
12 To control for regional variation, the model includes indicators for practice in a metropolitan statistical area ("MSA: Miami Dade-Broward," "MSA: Other," and "non-MSA"), and indicators for the five state appellate court circuits. In addition, the demographics of the county in which the physician practices include the per capita income (real dollars measured in thousands) and education (percentage of the population with 16 or more years of education).
The model also includes several variables identifying aspects of the physician's practice. 13 First, the propensity to be sued may be related to the number of years the physician has been in practice. Additional experience is expected to reduce risk, but at a diminishing rate over the individual's life cycle. Because length of practice is unavailable, the log of the number of years the physician has been licensed in Florida in 1992 ("in years licensed") is used in its place. Second, a higher volume of patient visits is expected to increase the frequency of claims, but perhaps at a diminishing rate. This aspect is left out of earlier studies, with the exception of Sloan and Hassan (1990) . The mean-scaled number of patients seen by the doctor during an average week ("patient volume") captures the level of physician activity and the authors add its square for possible nonlinearities.
14 Finally, other researchers (Cooil, 1991; Sloan and Hassan, 1990) found that female physicians tend to have lower frequencies of suits, so a dummy for gender was also included. 12 If it were possible to do so, estimating a separate model for each specialty would allow for unique covariate effects. Alternatively, at a cost in terms of statistical efficiency, one could explore specifications involving interactive effects between specialty and other covariates in the model. In the current study, sample size limitations prevent attempting such a separate estimation or incorporating interactive effects by specialty. 13 A process of model selection preceded the final estimation. Variables considered and rejected include indicator variables for whether the physician was board certified, country of medical school education, population density, and percentage of the population older than 65. 14 As one referee pointed out, the use of a form that can accommodate nonlinearities would be of interest because a too high (or too low) patient volume may be associated with increased risk of errors and because the physician could adjust the volume of his or her practice to reduce the risk of malpractice suits.
RESULTS
Comparison of the Compound and Homogeneous Poisson Results
In a pure Poisson process, the mean will be equal to the variance. However, for the current data, shown in Table 1 , the variance of reported claims by year of filing clearly exceeds the mean in every year. Table 2 reports the estimates of both the homogeneous Poisson model and the model with individual heterogeneity. A test for overdispersion, i.e., variance greater than mean, rejects the hypothesis that claims risk is homogeneous (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986) , after controlling for observable characteristics. 15 Both models provide strong support for the hypothesis that specialty, region, patient volume, demographics, and gender are important factors in predicting the incidence of claims. The coefficient estimates seem very stable in terms of signs and magnitudes across model specifications; however, the coefficients in the compound Poisson are estimated with greater precision. Overall, the degree of similarity is surprising, because one might expect that failure to control for heterogeneity would introduce bias in the coefficient estimates (Heckman and Singer, 1984) . and obstetrics-gynecology are the highest-risk specialties, having roughly 3.5 times the predicted number of claims as general/family practice. Regional variation is also large: physicians in the Miami Dade-Broward MSA have about 1.5 times the expected number of claims as physicians in the rest of the state (whether in an MSA or not). Physicians in areas with a higher incidence of post-secondary schooling have lower claims incidence; however, increases in per capita income increase claims incidence.
Other variables that are not often used to determine malpractice insurance premiums show substantial marginal impacts. Female physicians can expect to have roughly 35 percent fewer claims than their male peers. The difference in risk associated with gender may reflect differences in patient mix or specialization within the broad specialty groups used here. Other things being equal, physicians with high patient loads would tend to incur a greater number of malpractice suits, and it is not surprising that patient volume has a statistically significant impact on the expected number of claims. Finally, the longer the physician has been in practice, the lower the predicted incidence of claims will be. Omission of these variables will tend to exaggerate the degree of residual risk heterogeneity.
Controlling for heterogeneity provides further benefits that can be seen by comparing goodness-of-fit in the observation period (1985 through 1989) . A measure of goodness-of-fit reported by Cooil (1991) and here in Table 2 is the total absolute prediction error, TAPE, defined as
where j p is the observed frequency of j claims, andˆj p is the predicted frequency for the sample. The model with individual heterogeneity gives a much better fit in terms of aggregate frequencies and, thus, has a much lower value of TAPE. Both models predict about the same number of total claims, so the difference in TAPE is due to a difference in the way the models distribute probability weights among the events (i.e., y i = 0, 1, 2, ..., 5).
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Heterogeneity Estimates and the Case for Experience Rating
After controlling in the model for an extensive set of covariates, there remains evidence of individual heterogeneity. This section shows how the estimated heterogeneity can provide a quantitative basis for experience rating. As discussed above, one can identify underlying risk types from the heterogeneity distribution and obtain posterior estimates of risk for each individual. In this manner, personalized surcharges are inferred from the mixing distribution. In the empirical model shown in Table 2 , each of the five support points estimated from the sample data can be interpreted as physician risk types and can be used to compare the expected number of claims per year for each type. The riskiest type in the population is rare, representing less than 1 percent of the population, but dangerous, generating nearly 12 times the predicted number of incidents of the average physician.
Experience-rated surcharges must be established prospectively, based on the model's forecast of the expected claims of each physician. With additional data on claims in the post-estimation period, the forecast accuracy can be readily checked against the observed pattern of claims. A series of one-year-ahead forecasts was obtained by estimating a model based on claims data from year t-4 to year t and then using the model to forecast claims in year t+1. These forecasts reflect the fact that insurers may revise their estimates of the effects of covariates and individual heterogeneity over time as new information arrives. Next, physicians were divided into 20 groups based on their ranking of estimated posterior risk types. Physicians in the bottom 5 percent, for example, have the lowest risk heterogeneity estimates and would benefit most from experience rating. Figure 1 shows the actual share of claims (bold solid line) as a function of the estimated individual heterogeneity ratings for 1990 and 1991. These yearly graphs are interpreted like a standard Lorenz curve in that they give the share of total claims incurred by physicians in each risk group cumulatively. For example, the 50 percent of physicians with the lowest risk ratings based on performance from 1985 through 1989 incurred around 45 percent of the total claims for 1990. The 45-degree line would be observed if all doctors in the sample were to have the same number of reported claims.
The predictions of the model incorporating heterogeneity (i.e., the model with experience rating) as well as the model ignoring heterogeneity (the model without experience rating) are shown in Figure 1 . Experience rating gives a much better fit to the actual share of claims from 1990 through 1992 than would occur without experience rating. If premiums were solely based on a priori ratings from the Poisson, then a fairly large cross-subsidy from lower-risk type doctors to higher-risk type doctors would exist. In 1990, for example, doctors in the lower 75 percent account for around 55.8 percent of actual claims but would be expected to pay 69.1 percent of total claims. Experience-rated premiums would both decrease the subsidy and reverse its direction: the lowest-risk doctors would be expected to pay for about 50.0 percent of total claims based on the model. The results for 1991 and 1992 are similar. There can be no argument for experience rating if, after controlling for covariates, no persistent differences in risk remained among physicians. If this were the case, then forecasts incorporating this information would lead to over-prediction for physicians with high risk-heterogeneity estimates and under-prediction for low-risk physicians. Figure 1 shows some indications of this phenomenon in that the claims of high-risk physicians would have been over-predicted for two years (1990 and 1991) , and low-risk claims are underestimated in 1990. However, even in these years, the forecast error is greater when this information is ignored.
The performance of models such as this one would be of central interest in the context of insurance schemes that base premiums on the claims forecasts. Table 3 gives a summary of the predictive accuracy of the compound Poisson in the one-year ahead forecasts. The predicted aggregate frequency of zero claims is too low, while the predicted frequency of n > 0 is too high, indicating that the forecasted aggregate number of claims is higher than the actual number. The TAPEs are roughly double the insample tapes reported in Table 2 . The compound Poisson is estimated using data from 1985 to year n-1, where n=1990 to 1995. The model is used to forecast claims in year n. Total Absolute Prediction Errors (TAPEs) are also shown for each year.
The adjusted prediction reflects a correction for the decline in the aggregate frequency of claims during the sample period.
As shown in Table 1 , the aggregate number of claims has fluctuated from 1985 through 1992. During the observation period 1985 through 1989, nearly one claim was reported per year for every ten physicians, while in later years, the average annual number of claims per physician was cut in half. This reduction in the average number of claims reflects both the cyclical nature of malpractice claims (Winter, 1988; Sloan, Bovbjerg, and Githens, 1991) as well as the impact of tort reforms enacted in 1980 , 1985 , and 1986 (Kessler and McClellan, 1996 . The estimated model from the observation period 1985 through 1989 will, therefore, forecast too many claims for 1990 through 1992. This is seen by the forecast errors reported for the one-year ahead forecasts in Table 3 .
Insurers can, however, and do use surcharges and rebates to adjust premiums when their aggregate forecasts are in error. A simple way to proxy these adjustments in the present model is to adjust the intercept so that the model predicts the correct number of claims for t+1. These adjusted predictions, also reported for each year in Table 3 , provide a substantially improved fit of the aggregate frequencies. This suggests that the changing frequency of claims is, indeed, a variation in intensity over time that tends to affect physicians across the board.
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For individuals who are to be assessed personalized surcharges based on these forecasts, the magnitude of individual forecast errors may be important to the acceptance of experience rating. Annual prediction errors are calculated as the difference between the predicted claims and the actual claims for that year given the data from the previous five years. Physicians were then sorted by their prediction errors for 1990. The individuals with the largest positive errors (i.e., whose number of claims exceeded the number predicted) and negative errors (i.e., whose number of actual claims was less than the predicted number) in 1990 were identified. Table 4 shows the prediction errors for this subset of physicians between 1990 and 1992. Large errors indicate that the model either over-predicted or under-predicted the number of claims that occurred. Consider first the case of over-prediction. For physicians in the top 2 percent, the model predicted these physicians would have, on average, 1.18 more claims than they did in 1990. These physicians would appear to be overcharged by experience rating. However, if claims follow a Poisson process, the realization of claims in any given year may differ from the expected number of claims resulting in forecast errors. Hence, some physicians will appear to be overcharged on the basis of one year's data even if the model has correctly estimated their risk on the basis of the preceding five years of data. 18 Therefore, the real test of whether experience rating wrongly penalizes these physicians on the basis of past claims is to examine the forecast errors that would be made for these physicians over time. In 1991, the over-prediction has shrunk to 0.03 claims, and by 1992 the predicted claims are now too low by 0.04 claims. Two reasons exist for this. First, as noted above, if claims follow a Poisson process and the risk type is correctly estimated, then the forecast error in subsequent years is expected to be zero. Second, given an error has occurred in 1990, the next forecast under experience rating will include the new information that claims were lower than predicted and the prediction will be adjusted down. Table 4 shows that where the model generates the largest prediction errors, the one-year ahead forecast errors for these individuals diminish quickly and are nearly zero within three years. Hence, where forecast errors are large in one year, both updating the forecast and observing another random "draw" from the Poisson distribution serve to eliminate the forecast errors fairly quickly.
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE RATING
Estimating the likely magnitude of the surcharges from experience rating, relative to unadjusted insurance premiums, helps to provide a more detailed understanding of the redistribution that would result from adoption of experience rating. One can illustrate this point by comparing the effects of experience rating for physicians within 18 For example, if the expected number of claims 1 M , then with probability 0.37, no claims will occur and the forecast error will be equal to 1 -0 = 1. Thus, out of 100 physicians, around 37 would have a forecast error equal to one claim. If we followed those 37 physicians for one more year, their average forecast error would be expected to be zero.
homogeneous groups, who are paying similar insurance premiums under current practice. Blair and Makar (1988) reported estimates of insurance rates in Florida during this study's sample period, and premiums varied significantly across specialties. Two of the smaller specialties, anesthesiology and obstetrics-gynecology, will be considered here. Because premiums in Miami Dade and Broward Counties are roughly double those in the rest of the state, physicians in each specialty practicing in Miami Dade or Broward County are further separated from those in the rest of the state.
Anesthesiologists in Miami Dade and Broward Counties
This sample of 131 physicians experienced 53 reported claims in the five-year period from 1985 to 1989, or around 0.08 claims per year per physician. These physicians were divided into ten groups ordered by posterior risk types. Table 5 reports the predicted annual number of claims for each risk group with and without experience rating. If anesthesiologists in Miami Dade/Broward had similar characteristics (e.g., patient volume and experience), then the a priori expected number of claims for each group would be the same. However, the authors find substantial variation in both a priori and a posteriori expected claims for each group, with physicians in the lowestrisk groups more likely to be a priori high risk, and physicians in higher-risk groups more likely to be a priori low risk. This is the key to understanding who has the most to gain and lose from the introduction of experience rating. Those who stand to gain the most will be physicians who are a priori high risk but do not incur a claim.
If the malpractice insurance premiums are actuarially fair, then the premiums will be equal to the product of the probability and expected cost of a malpractice claim. Absent information about the expected cost of a malpractice claim, one can estimate the expected percentage reduction in premiums from experience rating by calculating the percentage change in the predicted number of claims for each risk group. Given these assumptions, the estimated savings from experience rating for anesthesiologists in Miami Dade/Broward range from 39 percent to -88 percent. Overall, about 30 percent of these physicians can expect to pay higher rates, while the remainder can expect some premium relief. Based on roughly estimated cost of claims, 19 the experience-rated premiums would range from a low of $53,000 to a high of $191,000. The latter seems quite high; however, it is within the range of premiums paid by physicians in other specialties in Miami Dade and Broward Counties in 1987 (Blair and Makar, 1988) .
Anesthesiologists in the Rest of the State
The present sample contains 274 anesthesiologists practicing outside of Miami Dade and Broward Counties. They experienced about 0.08 reported claims per year on average during the period 1985 through 1989. 20 The experience-rated premiums range 19 The premium data from 1987 reported in Blair and Makar (1988) (Blair and Makar, 1988) . One hundred five claims over 5 years for 274 physicians yields an average of 0.077 claims per year. Cost of claim is $613,551.
from $21,000 to $87,000, while the premiums based only on a priori characteristics would range from $26,000 to $70,000. The percent savings from experience rating range from 34 percent to -119 percent, and roughly 70 percent of these physicians would benefit from the adoption of experience rating.
Obstetricians/Gynecologists
The sample has 193 obstetricians/gynecologists practicing in Miami Dade and Broward Counties and 123 practicing in the rest of the state. Overall, obstetricians/ gynecologists experienced about 0.15 reported claims per year on average during the period. 21 The experience-rated premiums in Miami Dade and Broward Counties, reported in Table 6 , range from $78,000 to $449,000, while the premiums based only on a priori characteristics range from $111,000 to $327,000. The percent savings from experience rating vary greatly, from 51 percent to -91 percent. Likewise, for the rest of the state, the experience-rated premiums range from $32,000 to $232,000, while the premiums based only on a priori characteristics range from $45,000 to $113,000. Overall, in both groups, between 60 percent and 70 percent of these physicians would benefit from the adoption of experience rating, some saving as much as 51 percent. The remaining 30 percent to 40 percent would expect to lose, some as much as 175 percent.
Summary
The range of estimated experience-rated premiums is not much larger than the range in the prevailing premium structure reported in Blair and Makar (1988) . At the same time, the surcharges under experience rating for the highest-risk groups in certain specialties like obstetrics and gynecology could be large enough to inflict financial distress on some practices. Perhaps the most striking result is the degree to which the benefits would be generally modest and widely dispersed among low-risk groups of physicians while the costs would be quite concentrated on the highest-risk groups. How will the median physician fare? Experience rating will be attractive to the majority of physicians if most physicians expect to benefit from its adoption, that is, when the distribution of claims is highly skewed. When controlling only for specialty, Ellis, Gallup, and McGuire (1990) find that the mean claims per year exceeds the rate for the median physician by a factor of five to one in about one-third of the specialties. Given this magnitude, one might expect to find strong support for experience rating in at least some specialties. In contrast, after jointly controlling for heterogeneity and covariates, the authors' estimated random-effects distribution is less skewed; the mean claims rate is 1.5 times the claims rate for the median physician. 22 Thus, most physicians can expect a more modest reduction in premiums due to experience rating, while only a few physicians would receive large surcharges or reductions. 21 The average premium for obstetricians/gynecologists in Miami Dade/Broward was $165,320 in 1987, implying a cost of $1,256,171 per claim. The average premium outside of Miami Dade/Broward was $87,542 in 1987, and this premium would correspond to a cost of $544,904 per claim. 22 Given the heterogeneity distribution reported in Table 2 , if all variables are set at their means values, the expected number of claims is 0.343 over five years while the median is 0.231, yielding a mean to median ratio of 1.5. (Blair and Makar, 1988) . Three hundred forty-three claims over 5 years for 427 physicians yields an average of 0.161 claims per year. Cost of claim is $544,904.
It should be acknowledged that the authors' model relies on a limited information set, relative to what insurers are likely to have, including a variety of "soft" information about the physicians' risk profiles. Types of soft information might include data on claims experience with other insurers or disciplinary actions against the physicians. The present results for experience rating are meant to address mature claims made policies-that is, policies written for individuals who have been with the same insurer for five years or more. Actual insurance policies must make provision for newly licensed physicians and transitions that occur when physicians switch insurers, die, retire, or become disabled. Experience rating would not apply to new physicians, and that is why the authors exclude them from the empirical analysis. The pricing of tail coverage for physicians who retire or switch insurers could be subject to the same experience rating provisions of physicians who remain with the insurer with appropriate adjustment made for the claims tail. Although these details will be extremely important in implementing an experience rating, this analysis is aimed primarily at demonstrating the feasibility of experience rating.
CONCLUSIONS
This study finds significant residual heterogeneity in medical malpractice claims, after controlling for observable physician characteristics. Residual heterogeneity provides a basis for determining personalized estimates of malpractice risk. In the absence of experience rating in insurance contracts, these estimates indicate substantial cross-subsidization from low-to high-risk physicians. Using the personalized risk estimates, one-year-ahead forecasts were evaluated for 1990 through 1992. The results indicate that risk heterogeneity persists in the sense that physicians identified as low risk a posteriori in the period from 1985 through 1989 are generally confirmed to be low risk from 1990 through 1992. An experience rating scheme based on the estimated model would greatly reduce cross-subsidization among physicians. Moreover, the resulting range of premiums appears to be reasonable; only a few individuals would be given large surcharges and the majority would receive modest discounts.
These findings are encouraging to anyone concerned about the feasibility of experience rating and clearly have efficiency implications for healthcare provision. Proponents of experience rating argue that the tort system is designed to provide incentives for care by allocating costs of negligence to the physician, and that current insurance blunts these incentives because all physicians share the costs. Although risk differences among physicians are treated as exogenous in this study, one could interpret the results as empirical estimates of the chosen risk parameters given the current system. Measurements of the incentive effects of experience rating will have to wait for future research on physicians in states where experience rating may become mandatory. A second reason for advocating increased refinement of ratings is that it may bring relief to physicians who are choosing to limit practice or self-insure rather than pay soaring premiums. The case of rural obstetricians is the most widely cited example of the former. Rising premiums for rural obstetrics can be offset by adjustments for patient volume and region, allowing the rural obstetrician to continue practicing. Recognizing that no set of covariates is likely to be found that captures all sources of risk, experience rating further reduces the extent of cross-subsidization between high-and low-risk practitioners. In the absence of experience rating, lower-risk physicians may choose to self-insure; however, this is an inefficient solution to cross-subsidization.
